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1. Introduction 
In recent years, robots have made substantial in-roads in the medical field and are 
gradually finding their way into clinical practice. Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci® surgical 
robot broke ground in 1998 by performing the first tele-robotic surgery to repair a heart 
valve (Salisbury, 1998; Guthart & Salisbury, 2000). Accuray’s CyberKnife radiotherapy 
robot began treating head, neck and upper spine tumors in 1999 by combining image 
guidance with a robotically-directed radiation beam (Adler et al., 1997). In 2002, 
Interactive Motion Technology began therapy of stroke patients with the InMotion2 robot, 
also known as the MIT-Manus (Krebs et al., 2002). These devices and many others under 
development have provided researchers and doctors alike with capabilities not previously 
available. 
These additional capabilities, however, have also brought with them the issue of safety – 
these are safety critical systems in which a single malfunction can endanger the life of the 
patient. In contrast with traditional robotic systems, medical robots must enforce the safety 
of the patient as an object within its workspace, while also being able to treat the patient. 
This dichotomy creates the need for a safety system that can allow the robot to interact with 
the patient, while also enforcing all necessary safety precautions. 
Human fatalities resulting from medical treatment with machines is unfortunately all-to-
real. The Therac 25, a radiation therapy machine developed by the Atomic Energy 
Commission of Canada, was involved in six known accidents between 1984 and 1987. Five 
patients died as a result of massive overdoses of radiation when a high power electron beam 
was activated without the target tumor having been rotated into place (Leveson & Turner, 
1993). Had the machine’s software detected the fault, the accident would have been averted. 
Radiation therapy machines are now required to have hardware interlocks to prevent 
activation of the high-energy electron-beam unless the target is in place. 
A similar tragedy occurred at the National Oncology Institute in Panama during 2000 and 
2001. Twenty-eight patients were overexposed during radiation therapy for cancer 
treatment, after use of a computerized treatment planning system. Dosage calculations 
from the planning system had errors of up to 105%. By August 2005, 23 out of 28 
overposed patients had died, of which at least 18 were attributed to radiation effects 
(Borras, 2006). 
Dangers in medical robotics are not confined to surgical systems. In powered orthoses or 
“exoskeletons” being developed for rehabilitation, humans are basically encapsulated in the 
device creating a potentially hazardous situation. Powered leg exoskeletons such as the the 
Lokomat™ Gait Orthosis are being used to train stroke and spinal cord injury patients how to O
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walk again (Bernhardt et al., 2005). Arm exoskeletons such as ARMOR (Mayr et al., 2006), 
ARMin (Nef et al., 2006), RUPERT (He et al., 2005), and UW Prototype III (Rosen, 2005) are 
being developed for therapy of hemiparetic stroke patients. The MGA Exoskeleton is being 
used for shoulder rehabilitation and is comparable in strength to the average adult male 
(Carignan et al., 2005). While all of these systems have adequate sensors to control the robot, 
they are insufficient to enforce patient safety. 
It is important to realize that safety is not an absolute concept – a system can only be built to 
reduce the risk of an accident to an acceptable level (Shaw, 1995; Dunn, 2003). Safety is also 
an attribute of the entire system and is not driven by only certain components of the system. 
This requires that safety analyses include all system components: software, hardware, and 
the operators (Anderson, 1993; Leveson, 1995; Sommerville, 1995). 
This chapter will detail a system safety design process that can systematically evaluate 
the design of a rehabilitation robot against its project safety and failure rate criteria. 
When these criteria are not satisified, the process can identify system components or 
failure combinations that require additional design consideration, so that the project 
criteria might be satisfied. Modifications directed by this process can result in a 
sufficiently safe system design for safety-critical rehabilitation robot applications. The 
application of this process to two case studies will be presented. The first case study is 
the MGA Exoskeleton introduced above, which will be used as an illustrative example. 
The second case study is a multi-arm space robot experiment, to which this process was 
originally applied. This robot has several years of operational history against which this 
process can be evaluated.
Definitions
There are many different definitions of safety-related terms. For consistency, the definitions 
used in this chapter are taken from Vesely (1981) and Leveson (1995): 
- A failure is an abnormal occurrence 
- A fault is a higher-order event caused by one or more failures. 
- A hazard is a system state and other environmental conditions that inevitably leads 
to an accident. 
- An accident is an undesired and unplanned event that results in a level of loss, in 
this case, injury to the patient. 
- Safety is freedom from accidents. 
Fig. 1 depicts symbols used in this work to represent fault events and gates. 
Fig. 1. Symbols used in fault trees. 
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2. Safety analysis techniques 
Previous medical robotics have had to address the issue of patient safety (Varley, 1999; 
Taylor et al., 1991, Duchemin et al., 2004). One of the unique aspects of rehabilitation robots 
is that the human in-the-loop is the patient. With surgical or radiological systems such as Da
Vinci and Cyberknife, a patient is being “operated” on by the robot; however, a clinician is 
directing the robot. With a rehabilitation robot, the subject may fill the role of both patient 
and operator. This introduces additional safety criteria over and above that used in more 
traditional medical robots. 
Unfortunately, there is no industry-standard approach to designing these safety-critical robot 
systems. Despite this, numerous other fields have standard and accepted analytical methods 
used to design safety-critical systems (Weber et al., 2003). These methods come under the 
banner of “system safety engineering” (Stephenson, 1991; Blanchard, 1991), and have been 
used to develop safety-critical systems in domains ranging from aircraft flight management 
systems (Parnas et al., 1991) to nuclear power plants (Potocki de Montalk, 1991). 
2.1 Current approaches 
Some of the more common design techniques are described in the following sections and 
can be loosely categorized as either “top-down” or “bottom-up” techniques. Top-down 
techniques typically work from a high-level description, and attempt to identify 
combinations or sequences of components that contribute to system level events. Bottom-up 
techniques typically work from the component level outward and upward. Hybrid 
techniques combine both top-down and bottom-up approaches. A brief description is now 
given of the more standard techniques. 
2.1.1 Top-down approaches 
Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is an early phase of lifecycle-based hazard analysis, which 
also involves system and subsystem hazard analysis (Leveson, 1995). Its objective is to 
assess potential hazards caused by the system, to identify inherent hazards, and to assess 
the criticality of arising accidents (Vesely, 1981). The resultant hazards can be used as inputs 
to fault tree analysis or similar techniques. 
Hazard operability is a qualitative, creative thinking technique developed by, and primarily used 
by, the chemical industry. It is simple, but very labor intensive, and is designed to identify and 
analyze hazards systematically (Stephenson 1991; Leveson, 1995). As with PHA, the results of a 
hazard operability study can be used as inputs to fault tree analysis or similar techniques. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive technique to determine the sequence of faults that 
could cause a given top-level hazard (or top event). The resulting fault trees can be 
represented as boolean expressions and reduced to the minimum combination of failures 
that could cause the top-level hazard. The trees can also be quantitatively evaluated to 
provide estimates of the probability of the top event occurring, given the probabilities of the 
constituent failures. Fault trees can have trouble dealing with timing (Gorski et al., 1995), 
redundancy, and differing mission phases (Leveson, 1995). It is also a time-consuming, 
qualitative technique, although its absolute accuracy is usually secondary to identifying 
failure sequences (Ozog & Bendixen, 1987). The determination of the top-level event is 
critical; failure to determine a top-level event by a PHA, for example, results in the hazard 
not being examined and, consequently, the system may not cope with that hazard (Leveson, 
1995; Vesely, 1981).
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While typically applied to a system design, FTA has recently been applied to software to 
determine how failures in its implementation could cause a hazard (Leveson 1984; Knight 
& Nakano, 1997). It can be used to determine cases where the implemented design could 
cause a hazard, or show which modules are most critical to the safe operation of the 
system. Methods exist to potentially build the trees from a logical system model (Bruns & 
Anderson, 1993), or from a completed code base (Voas, 1995), though this may occur too 
late in the design cycle to be cost-efficient. It also difficult to evaluate such fault trees 
quantitatively, as there exist few methods to assign probabilities to failure of software 
logic. 
2.1.2 Bottom-up approaches 
Failure mode effects analysis (FMEA) is traditionally used to predict equipment reliability and 
emphasizes successful functioning of a component as opposed to the failure of the 
component. It is a systematic technique that is system-oriented, not hazard-oriented (Hope 
et al., 1983). It is more time-consuming than fault tree analysis and does not cope with 
multiple failures, timing, or redundancy (Ozog & Bendixen, 1987; Leveson, 1995). 
Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) is a very similar technique, that adds 
extra steps and data to an FMEA related to controls and control procedures. 
Event tree analysis is an inductive method to identify outcomes of a given initiating event 
and can identify the components that most contribute to a failure. It is practical for 
independent events and a stable event chronology, and may provide top events for 
subsequent fault tree analysis. Event trees can become very large and suffer difficulties with 
timing data and more than two states. They may also require fault tree analysis to develop 
failure probabilities for branches, and analysts have to be able to define all initiating events 
(Ozog and Bendixen, 1987; Leveson, 1995). 
2.1.3 Hybrid approaches 
Cause-consequence techniques combine fault-trees and event-trees. They work by selecting a 
critical event and determining the contributing factors using fault tree analysis and the 
resulting consequences using event tree analysis. They can represent delays and event 
combinations, but they can become large and unwieldy. In addition, their outcome is only 
related to the cause being analyzed (Hope et al., 1983; Leveson, 1995). 
2.1.4 Synthesized techniques 
Applied in isolation, none of the above techniques can produce a system design that is 
sufficiently safe. Synthesizing combinations of these techniques can produce a system safety 
design process that utilizes the strengths of each technique, thereby providing a design 
methodology that not only identifies hazards and their contributing fault scenarios, but can 
also potentially evaluate the design qualititively and quantitatively. This synthesized 
technique may be used to determine the specific need of additional system components, 
required to enforce the project’s safety critiera. 
2.2 Previous synthesized safety analyses 
Lankenau et al. (1998) combined FTA along with formal methods, to develop a safety layer 
for an autonomous wheelchair. They also applied a model checker over the fault trees, to 
attempt to verify that the system could never fail. 
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Combining FTA with an unspecified failure mode analysis technique, Cavallaro & Walker 
(1997) evaluated the safety and reliability of a manipulator system for hazardous material 
retrieval. They show results for only one hazard, and noted that some failure modes were 
not considered due to lack of details on software configuration and the operator interfaces. 
Guiochet & Vilchis (2002) combined FMEA and FTA in a safety analysis of the design of an 
ultrasound robot for tele-echography. The two analyses were used in conjunction due to the 
complementary forward/backward approaches. While a hazard analysis is mentioned as 
part of their process, it is unclear where it fits into their process. They use FMEA to identify 
the failure leading to an accident, and use that failure as a top event for subsequent FTA. As 
some accidents require multiple failures either combinatorially or sequentially, these 
hazards will not be identified by the FMEA. However, results of the FMEA could be used to 
identify corrective measures for the system. 
2.3 Chosen synthesized technique 
For this work, a synthesized approach was chosen that combines PHA and FTA. This 
provides the means to enumerate the hazards a system presents, a method to determine the 
fault sequence and/or combinations that can cause the hazards, and both qualitative and 
quantitative metrics against which project safety and failure rate criteria can be compared. 
FTA was chosen over such techniques as FMEA, event trees or cause consequence trees 
since, in our experience, there are far fewer hazards than there are failure combinations 
leading to such hazards. Construction of fault trees requires less work than the other 
techniques in this scenario — however, the issues of timing and redundancy in a robot 
system must be explicitly addressed within the FTA. 
For the two case studies presented here, the distributed, hard real-time nature of the robot is 
leveraged alongside safety checks to specifically target components that do not make their 
deadlines. It is considered a failure if a computing component does not make an internal 
processing deadline, or an external communication deadline. This is an FTA primitive 
event, allowing timing-related failures to be explicitly modelled in the fault trees. 
Redundant components may be explicitly modelled within the fault trees. This leads to 
more work in the fault tree construction but ensures that the redundancy is dealt with 
directly. It is also possible to ignore redundancy under certain circumstances, where the 
modelling of additional components would only lead to decreased hazard probabilities. In 
this case, the resultant hazard probabilities will err on the conservative side. 
The approach described here was initially developed for a dexterous robot designed to fly 
on NASA’s space shuttle (Roderick et al., 2004). This system was the first (and to our 
knowledge, the only) American robotic system to be certified through three of the four 
phases of the NASA Space Shuttle Safety Review process. This pioneered a solely computer-
based hazard control system for payloads operating on the shuttle, and demonstrated 
successful application of this technique to a safety-critical robot system. 
3. System safety design process 
The overall goal of this process is to evaluate a system design to determine whether it is 
“sufficiently safe”. The concept of sufficiently safe is one that the specific project must 
establish, which forms the basis for the project’s safety criteria. This will include factors such 
as regulatory standards as well as the potential consequences to the patient of an accident 
occurring. It is not possible to make a system absolutely safe; however, if the likelihood of 
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an accident is small enough — or the consequences of an accident are negligible enough — 
the system may be considered sufficiently safe (Anderson, 1993; Shaw, 1995). At some point, 
continuing to modify a system design to cope with ever more incredible failures simply 
results in an excessively complex design, and a subsequent reduction in overall system 
reliability and/or safety (Duchemin et al., 2004). Notably, this concept of accepting some 
degree of risk is enshrined in UK law under the principle of reducing risks as low as reasonably 
practicable (McDermid, 2001). 
3.1 Process description 
A flow diagram illustrating the system safety design process is shown in Fig. 2. The basic 
inputs to this process are an initial system design description, the project safety criteria, and 
the project failure rate criteria. During a given iteration of the system design, the specific 
deliverables or outputs from this process are a list of hazards from the PHA, the fault trees 
from the FTA, and any qualitative and/or quantitative results from the FTA. These outputs 
also form the overall outputs of the process. 
The initial system design is evaluated through a PHA, and the hazards identified by the 
PHA each constitute top events from which FTA can begin. Each top event is considered 
individually, and the immediate, necessary, and sufficient causes by which this event could 
occur are identified. These immediate events are summarily examined for their causal 
events, and this step-by-step analysis continues until individual component failures are 
reached. These component failures are the basic causes that, when combined in the manner 
indicated by the fault tree, guarantee that the top level hazard will occur. (See Leveson 
(1995) for further details of PHA, and Vesely (1981) for fault trees and their construction.) 
The resulting fault trees can be qualitatively examined to determine if the project’s safety 
criteria are being met, i.e., whether the system is sufficiently safe. If not, additional 
components may be added in an effort to deal with the specific safety issues raised by the 
FTA. The system design is then modified accordingly, and the process begins again. Once 
the FTA results show that the project’s safety criteria are met, the system design can be 
considered sufficiently safe. 
The qualitative analysis entails forming and evaluating the minimal cut sets for each fault 
tree. A minimal cut set is defined as a smallest combination of component failures which, if they 
all occur, will cause the top level hazard to occur (Vesely, 1981). The minimal cut sets can be 
ranked by size, providing a qualitative indication of failure importance and the ability to 
determine if the system meets its design criteria. If failure events are assumed to be 
independent, then the failure probabilities associated with minimal cut sets can decrease by 
several orders of magnitude as the size of the cut set increases. Hence ranking cut sets gives 
a gross indication of the importance of the cut set (Vesely, 1981). 
Once the system design has satisfied the project’s safety criteria, the fault trees can be 
quantitatively analyzed to determine an indicative system failure rate. An overall 
probability for each cut set is evaluated based upon the failure probabilities of its 
constituent events. The top-level hazard is then a function of the probabilities of each of its 
constituent cut sets. If the computed system failure rate is higher than desired, then 
sensitivity analysis of the input fault probabilities can indicate which components 
signficantly contribute to the overall rate. These specific components can be flagged for 
additional inspection or higher-tolerance part replacement, in an effort to reduce their 
failure probability. In addition, further iterations of the safety design process may occur 
with the aim of modifying the system design to reduce the system failure rate, while still 
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satisfying the project’s safety criteria. A more detailed description of the quantitative 
analysis is outlined in the next section. 
Fig. 2. Approach to system design for safety. 
3.2 Quantitative Analysis 
The lambda-model adopted for this analysis assumes that events are mutually independent 
and mutually exclusive, and requires knowledge of whether a failure is repairable or non-
repairable (Vesely, 1981). The linear assumptions of this model will result in a 
conservative estimate of hazard probability, thus allowing only an order of magnitude 
accuracy. Given the additional imprecision in the input failure probability data, this 
allows only indicative quantitative evaluation. The following development is summarized 
from (Vesely, 1981). 
The failure probability distributions are exponential as the model assumes that the failure 
probabilities are directly related to component operating times. Hence, the probability F(t)
that the component suffers its first failure within time period t, given it is initially 
working, is 
 F(t) = 1- e-O t (1) 
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which is accurate to within 5% for F(t) < 0.1 and can be approximated to first order by 
 F(t) # O t (2) 
The derivative of F(t), the probability density function f(t), is 
 f(t) = O e-O t (3) 
Let q(t) be the component unavailability, 
 q(t) = F(t) # O t (4)
the probability that the component is down at time t and unable to operate if called 
upon. 
Let w(t) be the component failure occurrence rate 
 w(t) = f(t) = O e- O t (5)
where w(t)'t is the approximate probability that the component fails between time t and 
t+'t. For time t small compared to 1/O, such that O t < 0.1, e- O t # 1, 
 w(t) = f(t) # O (6)
Let Wi(t), the minimal cut set occurrence rate for cut set i, be the probability per unit time of 
the minimal cut set i failure occurring 
Wi(t) = q2(t)q3(t) … qni(t)w1(t) (7) 
 + q1(t)q3(t) … qni(t)w2(t)
  … 
 + q1(t)q2(t) … qni-1(t)wni(t)
where ni is the number of components in cut set i. The first term of Wi(t) is the probability 
that all components except component 1 are down at time t and then component 1 fails, and 
similarly for the other terms. Substituting (4) and (6) into (7), Wi(t) becomes 
Wi(t) = (O2 t) (O3 t) … (Oni t) O1 (8) 
 + (O1 t) (O3 t) … (Oni t) O2
  … 
 + (O1 t) (O2 t) … (Oni-1 t) O ni
 = ni 6i=1,ni (Oi)t
ni-1
The system failure occurrence rate, Ws(t), is the probability per unit time that the top event 
occurs at time t
 Ws(t) = 6i=1,N Wi(t) (9) 
where N is the number of minimal cut sets. For an operational system, the system failure 
rate, Ws(t), is the probability of interest. 
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4. Case Study: The MGA Exoskeleton rehabilitation robot 
The MGA Exoskeleton mentioned briefly in the introduction will be used as an illustrative 
example of how to conduct this design process. This arm exoskeleton was designed to treat 
shoulder pathologies such as rotator cuff tear and shoulder impingement syndrome. It has 
four shoulder degrees of freedom (three rotations and a scapula elevation), an elbow pitch 
joint, and a passive forearm pro/supination joint. It is capable of producing 134 N-m of 
torque at each shoulder joint and 64 N-m at the elbow, which is comparable to the output of 
the average adult male (Caldwell et al., 1998). The human interfaces consist of a torso mount 
for the scapula, an orthotic splint for the upper arm, and a hand grip. The system is fast and 
powerful, and because of the arm restraints, fast patient egress is not possible. 
The project safety criteria specifies that no single failure can cause a hazard and the the system 
must be fail-safe. A fail-safe system is one that will achieve a safe state in the presence of a 
detected fault (Dunn, 2003; Roderick et al., 2004). When a fault is detected, the exoskeleton 
should either a) halt arm motion and hold the current position, or b) safe the arm by removing 
power to the motors. It is important to note here that fail-safe does not necessarily mean 
powering off the robot – that might actually endanger the patient more. For example, placing 
the exoskeleton in a passive, gravity-assist configuration might be the primary fail-safe state. 
Conducting a fault tree analysis is a top-down process in which the operating modes and 
control system form an integral part. The procedure, illustrated in Fig. 3, begins with the 
task protocol such as enabling a resistive rotational movement about the shoulder. The task 
then determines the operating mode of the robot. For example, performing a shoulder 
abduction exercise would require that the resistance profile about a particular shoulder axis 
be controlled. The operating mode then determines what controller(s) needs to be activated 
to realize that particular protocol. Finally, the safety system must monitor and protect the 
patient from potential hazards during execution of the task. 
Fig. 3. The medical robot design begins with the task and loops to the safety system and 
back again. 
4.1 Protocols and Operating Modes 
There are basically two classes of shoulder therapy protocols currently being implemented 
on the exoskeleton: iso-lateral exercise and functional training. Iso-lateral exercises are those 
that occur around a single rotation axis of the shoulder or along a straight line path of the 
hand. Functional training involves more general movement of the hand through three-
dimensional space which occurs in everyday tasks. 
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Iso-lateral exercises closely mimic those currently performed manually or with the assistance 
of exercise machines. Examples of shoulder rotation exercises include shoulder 
abduction/adduction and internal/external rotation as shown in Fig. 4 (Liszka, 2006). In 
rotational exercises, the motion of the shoulder joints is determined by the resistance about 
the desired shoulder axis of rotation. Examples of exercises involving straight line motion of 
the hand include upright rows and wall push-ups. 
Fig. 4. Exoskeleton shown at (a) full shoulder adduction (b) 90 degree shoulder abduction, 
(c) mid-elbow flexion, and (d) near full lateral rotation. 
During functional training, the patient views the simulated task and a representation of their 
arm through a head mounted display, while the exoskeleton provides haptic feedback to the 
patient. A force sensor located at the hand gripper senses the forces being exerted by the 
patient during “contact” with the virtual environment and relays them to the controller 
which commands the exoskeleton in response to the interaction. Examples of functional 
training are proprioceptive neuromuscular facilitation (PNF) patterns and simulations of 
activites of daily living. 
4.2 Control System 
The modular control architecture implemented on this system is shown in Fig. 5. The 
exercise protocol is first parsed into a control mode based on the desired activation of the 
arm joints. This code then determines which controller(s) should be activated for the 
possible combinations of arm groups: scapula, shoulder, elbow pitch, and elbow orbit. 
These groups can implement impedance (torque command) and admittance (position 
command) modes depending upon the availability of force sensing and the impedance 
settings. In the case where both modes are feasible, e.g. rowing, the level of impedance often 
determines which mode will be implemented. 
As an example, the impedance control module used for controlling the resistance about an 
arbitrary shoulder axis is shown in Fig. 6. The stiffness and damping about the desired 
Cartesian axes of rotation are set using the desired impedance Zd. The desired orientation of 
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the glenhumeral (GH) joint is input to the controller and “differenced” with the sensed GH 
orientation computed from the forward kinematics of the shoulder joints to produce the 
angle-axis error. The GH angular velocity error is then multiplied by the desired impedance 
to produce the desired GH torque. This torque is then mapped to joint torques Wd via the 
transpose-Jacobian, which is added to a feedforward compensation torque to produce the 
torque servo command Wd.
Fig. 5. Modular control architecture for the MGA Exoskeleton. 
Fig. 6. Exoskeleton impedance controller for shoulder axis rotation. 
4.3 Safety System 
The above control modes and their associated control systems define the minimum suite of 
sensors and actuators that are required to carry out operations, a partial diagram of which is 
shown in Fig. 7. This constitutes the initial system design description, and must now be 
evaluated to determine whether it satisfies the safety criteria of the project. 
The PHA for this project involved defining the system boundary, determining the types of 
possible accidents, and identifying hazards that may cause such accidents. The following 
were used to aid in identification of the hazards: lessons learned from previous robotic 
systems, historical operational data, and critical examination of the results of the PHA 
conducted on a previous robot with a similar architecture (the second case study in this 
work). Conducting a PHA is an iterative engineering task, and required several sessions. 
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Given the initial system design description (shown visually in Fig. 7), the PHA identified 
three potential hazards (in this context, “excessive” means an unhealthy level, leading to 
injury): 
Hazard A: Moving the patient outside their safe position range. 
Hazard B: Moving the patient at an excessive velocity. 
Hazard C: Applying excessive torque to the patient or, conversely, 
allowing the patient to apply excessive torque against the robot. 
Each of these hazards will be considered in turn, through the FTA and subsequent 
modifications to the system design. 
Fig. 7. Initial system design. This is the minimum suite of sensors and actuators required for 
operations. For clarity, only major system components are shown. Also, the set of sensors 
and actuators required for only one of the five degrees of freedom is shown. 
4.3.1 Hazard A: Moving the patient outside their safe position range 
A fault tree developed from the initial system design of Fig. 7, and the top event “Moving 
the patient outside their safe position range”, is shown in Fig. 8. The top event can be caused 
by any one of numerous possible intermediate events, due to the OR gate attached to the top 
event (see definitions in Fig. 1). The intermediate event shown, “Uncommanded motion due 
to joint runaway”, can be caused solely by a failure of the incremental encoder, which is a 
primary component of the control law used to drive the motor. 
This scenario fails the project safety criteria, and so additional components were added to 
the system and the PHA and FTA were repeated. The modified system design is shown in 
Fig. 9, where the shaded components, an absolute encoder and a power amplifier, are 
additions over the initial system design (Roderick & Carignan, 2005). 
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Fig. 8. Fault tree for the initial system design and the top event “Moving the patient outside 
their safe position range”. This fault tree shows that a single fault, that of the incremental 
encoder, could cause the top event to occur. 
The fault tree for this top event and the modified system design is shown in Fig. 10. This 
fault tree considers the addition of a second encoder and a software-based divergence check 
to the system design. The divergence check is designed to detect a failed encoder by 
comparing the values of the two encoders, and flagging a fault if they differ by more than a 
prescribed tolerance. This fault tree demonstrates that the addition of the second encoder 
and the encoder divergence check will satisfy the project safety criteria for this hazard: no 
one failure is capable of producing the hazard. 
Fig. 9. Modified system design with additional components to satisfy project safety criteria. 
The additions over the initial system design of Fig. 7 are shaded. For clarity, only major 
system components of relevance are shown. Also, the set of sensors and actuators required 
for only one of the five degrees of freedom is shown. 
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While the modified system design does prevent a single failure from causing this hazard, 
closer examination of Fig. 10 shows that a double failure could still cause the hazard. If both 
encoders fail in such a way that they output almost the identical same value they would 
pass the encoder divergence check. While this failure combination is possible, particularly 
for certain values (depending on the encoders construction, 0 or -1 are likely candidates), it 
is highly unlikely to occur at the same time, and thus could be deemed an “incredible” 
failure and removed from further analysis. While further modifications to the system 
design, such as a third encoder, may enable detection of such situations, the additional 
system complexity may be unwarranted as well as potentially contributing to lower system 
reliability. The tradeoff between these measures is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Fig. 10. Fault tree for the modified system design and the top event “Moving the patient 
outside their safe position range”. This fault tree indicates that two simultaneous faults are 
required for the intermediate event shown to cause the top event to occur. 
To help determine the overall likelihood of such incredible failures occurring, the fault trees 
may be quantitatively evaluated. As noted in Section 3.1, FTA is generally a qualitative 
technique, who’s quantitative accuracy is indicative at best. Quantitative analysis may 
therefore simply be beneficial in ranking failures by probabilistic likelihood, versus using 
the output probabilities as absolute indications of safety (Roderick, 2000). 
4.3.2 Hazard B: Moving the patient at an excessive velocity 
The fault trees for this hazard are very similar in structure to those for the previous hazard. 
This is primarily due to the system computing velocity based on sequential encoder 
readings, and hence there are identical measures to sense excessive velocity or to detect a 
failed component that contributes to velocity sensing. Thus, this hazard is not considered 
any further here. 
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4.3.3 Hazard C: Applying excessive torque to the patient 
A fault tree for the initial system design and the top event, “Applying excessive torque to 
the patient”, is shown in Fig. 11. A single failure of the servo controller, which is responsible 
for providing power to the motor, is capable of producing uncommanded motion and 
hence, potentially, applying excessive torque to the patient. The fault tree of Fig. 12 is for the 
modified system design and shows the addition of a separate power amplifier with built-in 
motor current sensor, as well as a software-based motor power check (not shown). This 
power check compares the motor current draw with the requested output of the servo 
controller, to determine if either component is at fault. This fault tree indicates that the 
project safety criteria are satisfied by these additions. 
Fig. 11. Fault tree for the initial system design and the top event “Applying excessive torque 
to the patient”. This fault tree shows that a single fault, that of the servo controller, could 
cause the top event to occur. 
Fig. 12. Fault tree for the modified system design and the top event “Applying excessive 
torque to the patient”. This fault tree indicates that two simultaneous faults are required for 
the intermediate event shown to cause the top event to occur. 
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4.4 Summary 
Through several iterations of system safety engineering, the final system design of Fig. 13 
was reached. Comparison with the initial system design of Fig. 7 shows the addition of extra 
sensors for each degree of freedom, as well as multiple emergency stop capabalities. Note 
that for brevity of explanation, only trivial examples of fault trees and their associated 
system design modifications have been shown. This project is also a work-in-progress, so 
little operational data exists at this time. Therefore, operational results from a similar robotic 
system with a substantial amount of operating time will now be considered. 
Fig. 13. Final system design showing the additional safety-related components (shaded), 
over those required solely to realize the system’s control modes.
5. Case study: The Ranger Telerobotic Shuttle Experiment 
The system safety design process described here was originally applied to the Ranger 
Telerobotic Shuttle Experiment (RTSX). This four-manipulator, 33 degree of freedom robot 
was designed and built to fly on NASA’s space shuttle as a satellite servicing flight 
demonstration experiment. The robot has sufficient power, speed and reach, to potentially 
damage or destroy critical components necessary for the shuttle’s operation and safe return 
to Earth. Non-flight versions of this robot have several hundred hours of lab and neutral 
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buoyancy operational time over the past five years. This provides long term data against 
which this system safety design process can be evaluated. 
The MGA Exoskeleton in the previous case study and the RTSX robot have similar overall 
system architectures, and both use identical electromechanical actuator and sensor 
technology. They also use similar control software, with variations only in the specific 
control modes, device drivers, and the safety checks specific to each robot. Though the 
hazards listed for each system may appear different, the subtrees contributing to the 
individual hazards are nearly identical for each robot (e.g. encoders failing and causing 
uncommanded motion, distributed control components failing to meet their deadline). This 
strong similarity allows for direct application of the process to both robot systems. 
The project safety critiera were driven by a NASA-defined “fail-safe” hazard control 
approach. This pioneering approach (for NASA) allowed a computer-based control system 
to have total control of a hazardous payload when traditional approaches are infeasible 
(Roderick et al., 2004). The fundamental precept of this fail-safe approach is that the control 
system must reliably detect the first failure and transition the system to a safe state. The system 
need not necessarily be one-fault tolerant, nor does it have to cope with failures subsequent 
to the first. It simply has to be able to reliably attain a safe state despite the presence of any 
one failure. This defined the project safety critiera. The project failure rate criteria were 
based on the intended 48-hour mission length. 
Based on an initial system design, a PHA identified the following three hazards that Ranger 
presented to the shuttle and its crew: 
Hazard A: Manipulator motion physically damages the shuttle or prevents 
a safe return to Earth (e.g. by preventing the payload bay doors 
from closing) 
Hazard B: Releasing an untethered object (e.g. an orbital replacement unit) 
that damages the shuttle or becomes orbital debris 
Hazard C: An object (e.g. an item’s restrainting bolt) breaks due to 
excessive force or torque, and the subsequent pieces damage the 
shuttle or become orbital debris 
Applying FTA to the initial system design, given these three hazards, resulted in the 
addition of double and triple modular redundancy in certain critical computer components, 
software algorithms, and sensors. It also resulted in a complete partitioning of system wide 
safety protocols into an autonomous vehicle-based software safety system that was totally 
isolated from the rest of the system (Roderick, et al., 2004). This mechanism alleviated the 
need for safety certification and verification of operators, input devices, communication 
protocols, and the multitude of operator control stations. This dramatically reduced the 
complexity of the safety system, which in turn reduced development time, testing effort, 
and (hopefully) produced a more reliable and safer system. 
5.1 Qualitative analysis 
The distribution of minimal cut sets by size, for each hazard, is shown graphically in Fig. 14 
for the final system design. There are over 3500 minimal cut sets in total, with the smallest 
minimal cut set size being 2, the maximum size 13, and the average size about 5. As there 
are no single-component minimal cut sets, this system design satisfies the project’s safety 
criteria. Although there exist double component cut sets, the majority of failure scenarios 
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leading to a hazard involve three or more events. Fig. 14 also shows that only Hazards A 
and C have double component cut sets, and Hazard B requires at least three failures before a 
hazard can occur. There is a significant difference in the number of minimal cut sets for each 
hazard, largely due to the varying number and size of subtrees for each individual hazard. 
5.2 Quantitative analysis 
A quantitative probabilistic analysis of RTSX’s fault trees was conducted based on limited 
historical data available from a prototype robot. For this analysis, all RTSX failures were 
considered non-repairable, since during the mission neither hardware nor software could be 
repaired nor modified. In computing the hazard probabilities, the assumption of the O-
model that Ot < 0.1 (in order to simplify F(t) = 1-e-O t) was not valid for the two largest failure 
probabilities. This assumption was considered acceptable at that time, which has since been 
validated by operational results. 
Fig. 14. Distribution of minimal cut set sizes, by hazard. 
The estimated probabilities of the occurrence of Hazards A, B, and C for t=1 hour are 0.0464, 
0.00182, and 0.00783, respectively. Though this type of probabilistic analysis is known to be 
conservative, these numbers are uncomfortably high. Examination of the individual 
subtrees showed that the top five subtrees are significantly more likely to occur then the 
remaining subtrees. The probabilities of these top five most likely subtrees, and their 
percentage contribution to their parent hazard’s probability, are shown in Table 1. Note that 
the probability of occurrence in one hour of the remaining subtrees is 0.00005 or lower, or at 
least two orders of magnitude less likely than any of the top five most likely subtrees. Also 
note that Hazards B and C are both predominantly caused by one subtree each, i.e., one set 
of failure combinations. The components and failures making up these individual subtrees 
could be targetted for significant examination and validation, or potential redesign to 
reduce their overall probablity of occurence. Note once again that hazard probabilities 
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calculated from an FTA are only indicative, due to the inherent uncertainty in failure 
probabilities and the assumptions of the lamba-model. 
Sensitivity analysis of the input failure probabilities was conducted on all subtrees, in an effort to 
identify the effect of their inherent uncertainty. This uncertainty occurs due to assumptions made by 
manufacturers when defining failure rates for individual commercial off-the-shelf components, as 
well as from the assumptions and estimates used to extrapolate data from the historical prototype 
system.
Subtree Type 
Probability
of occurrence 
in 1 hour 
% of parent 
hazard’s
probability
A3  Main DMU SW failure causes excess velocity 0.038 81.9 
C2  FT sensor failure causes over-torque 0.00775 98.9 
A4  Operator failure causes boundary crossing 0.00705 15.2 
B1  Operator failure causes gripper open 0.00179 98.2 
A2  LPU SW failure causes excess velocity 0.00122 2.6 
Table 1. Estimated probabilities for top five most likely subtrees, and their percentage 
contribution to the parent hazard’s probability. 
This analysis individually varied the input failure probability of each failure contributing in 
a fault tree, and determined the subsequent variation in the parent hazard’s probability. 
Each input failure probability was varied up and down by one order of magnitude. The 
variation in Hazard C’s probability, as a function of the variation in input failure probability 
is shown in Fig. 15. As expected, the plots indicate a general exponentially increasing effect 
on the hazard probability as a function of increased individual failure probability. The 
graph dramatically illustrates that a small number of failure probabilities can significantly 
increase the overall hazard probability. These individual components could be targeted for 
additional testing to better determine their predicted failure rates, with a subsequent 
improvement in the accuracy of the overall hazard probabilities. The graphs for Hazards A 
and B show the same trends and are not presented here. 
5.3 Summary 
Despite having fairly high hazard probabilities, RTSX has operated well below these 
numbers indicating that the computed quantitative probabilities are indeed conservative. In 
several hundred hours of operation, only one accident has occurred, which was in the form 
of uncommanded motion. This failure was due to an improperly coded safety check on the 
bounds of a critical input parameter, and it occurred in the presence of an incomplete and 
more primitive safety system than was specified in the final system design. The rarity of 
these events is perhaps an indicator of the overly conservative nature of the probability 
analysis, as well as an outgrowth of the estimates used in extrapolating failure probabilities 
from a prototype historical system. The solid operational history may, in fact, validate the 
system design modifications indicated by this process, and demonstrate the success of the 
process when applied to a safety critical robot system. 
6. Conclusion 
A methodology has been presented that can qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate a 
system design against a set of project safety criteria. This methodology allows system 
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designers to target individual components or failures, in an effort to make the system more 
safe. While this methodology cannot produce an absolutely safe system, it provides a 
mechanism by which a system design can be judged to be sufficiently safe. The 
methodology also provides for indicative quantitative analysis of a system, which evalutes 
the system’s overall failure rate. 
This methodology was applied to two example robotic systems: a shoulder rehabilitation 
exoskeleton and a multi-arm dexterous space robot. Qualitative analysis of each system 
allowed for targetted modifications to the system design, producing final systems that were 
sufficiently safe when judged against the project’s safety criteria. Quantitative analysis of 
the second system indicated uncomfortably high failure probabilities, however, operational 
data to date indicates the very conservative nature of this analysis, and validates that it can 
only be used as an indicative evaluation. 
Future work for the MGA exoskeleton involves full completion of the FTA, including 
enumeration of all cut sets, as well as completion of the quantitative analysis. A partial FMEA 
has already been performed on the MGA Exoskeleton. Completion of this FMEA and 
comparison to the PHA hazard list may indicate additional hazards, or subtrees of the FTA, that 
need to be considered. Also, a more comprehensive version of this process would include an 
FMEA as a useful component. Operational data will continue to be taken for RTSX, and for the 
exoskeleton once development is complete. Comprehensive comparison of the operational data 
with respect to the input failure proabilities may help identify certain failures or failure types, 
that untowardly affect the hazard probability. These variances in the input failure probabilities 
could be taken into account to improve the accuracy of future quantitative analyses. 
Fig. 15. Percent variation in Hazard C probability as a function of variation in failure probabilities. 
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